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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
JON DONALD HAMLING, : Case No. 20000813-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Jon Donald Hamling 
("Appellant" or "Hamling") and entered judgment of conviction for Attempted Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 42). A copy of the Judgment is in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear 
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia? 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107,1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether 
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the 
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himself from sentencing is 
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433,438 (Utah App. 
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for 
correctness). Any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See generally 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved at the sentencing hearing and by 
defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed six days after judgment (R. 64:2; 
41-42). After indicating that Hamling was not present, the trial judge stated, f,[f]or the 
record, I will, notwithstanding, I'm sure, your objection Ms. Sisneros, and for the record, 
I'll note your objection, proceed with sentencing at this time" (R. 64:2); see Addendum B 
containing transcript of sentencing hearing. The trial judge also entered findings of fact 
and conclusions of law regarding the propriety of sentencing Hamling in absentia, a copy 
of which is in Addendum C. In addition, defense counsel filed a timely motion to correct 
an illegal sentence, which the judge denied; see motion in Addendum D. This issue was 
therefore preserved for appeal. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provision is in Addendum E: 
Utah R.Crim. 17(a)(2); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
2 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 7,2000, the state charged Hamling with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, to-wit: methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and possession of a 
controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana, class B misdemeanor (R. 05-06). On June 15, 
2000, Hamling pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn (R. 79). A copy of the 
plea hearing is in Addendum F. Judge Quinn scheduled sentencing for August 4,2000 
before the Honorable J. Frederick Dennis and referred Hamling for preparation of a 
presentence report (R. 64:3). 
Hamling appeared for the preparation of a presentence report but did not appear at 
sentencing (R. 64:3). Judge Frederick sentenced him to the maximum one-year sentence 
(R. 64:4). 
On August 9, 2000, the trial judge signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 38-39); see Addendum C. On August 10, 2000, defense counsel filed a motion to 
correct the sentence (R. 41-42); see Addendum D. On August 30,2000, the trial judge 
denied the motion to correct the sentence by signed minute entry (R. 46). Appellant filed 
a timely notice of appeal on August 31,2000 (R. 48). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs detective observed what he thought was a drug sale (R. 4). He followed one of 
the vehicles to a church parking lot where the officer parked and approached the vehicle 
(R. 4). As the officer approached, the driver got out, removed his shirt, opened the 
passenger door, and placed his shirt inside (R. 4). While speaking with the driver, the 
officer looked inside the car and saw a bag of methamphetamine on the seat (R. 4). In a 
subsequent search of the vehicle, the officer found marijuana (R. 4). 
As Judge Quinn ordered, Hamling went to Adult Probation and Parole for 
preparation of a presentence report. As part of the preparation of the presentence report, 
the investigator made contact with Handling's sister, Jana (PSR: 11). Jana indicated that 
Hamling faces many challenges in life which included cognitive and mental health 
challenges (PSR: 11). She felt that he needed to leam living skills and that mental health 
or emotional counseling would help him be better able to live on his own and take care of 
daily tasks (PSR: 11). Jana indicated that she had to help Hamling get to meetings, 
appointments and court appearances, and she was not sure he could tell time (PSR:11). 
Hamling lived with his mother, who took care of him, until she passed away 
(PSR: 11). After his mother passed away, Hamling appears to have had a more difficult 
time managing his life (PSR:9, 11, 5-6). 
At the time of the PSR, Hamling had a job which he had had for two years (R. 14, 
4 
PSR: 10). He had been in the area for many years, had family here and had resided with 
an aunt for five years (R. 12; PSR:11). 
Although Hamling went to AP&P and had a presentence report prepared, he was 
not present at sentencing on August 4,2000 (R. 64), Judge Frederick noted Hamling's 
absence, acknowledged counsel's objection to sentencing in absentia, then concluded 
"based upon defendant's failure to appear, that he has voluntarily absented himself from 
these proceedings11 (R. 64:3). He afforded defense counsel the opportunity to speak on 
Hamling's behalf regarding the appropriate sentence, then imposed the maximum one-
year sentence (R. 64:4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge violated due process, the Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution 
right to presume, and the Rules of Criminal Procedure by sentencing Appellant in 
absentia. The record does not establish that Hamling knowingly or voluntarily waived his 
right to presence at sentencing in this case where he was not informed that he would be 
sentenced even if he were not present, and the record demonstrates that Hamling has 
challenges which would interfere with his ability to appear. The critical role of presence 
at sentencing requires that the right to presence not be lightly forfeited. In this case where 
Appellant did not waive his right to be present at sentencing, the trial court erred in 
sentencing him in absentia and the sentence must be vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA. 
The trial judge concluded "based upon defendant's failure to appear, that he has 
voluntarily absented himfself] from these proceedings" (R. 64:3). The judge sentenced 
Hamling to serve the maximum one-year jail sentence (R. 64:4). The prosecutor 
thereafter prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, a copy of which is in 
Addendum C. By sentencing Hamling in absentia, the judge violated Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22, due process and Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution as well as the Sixth 
Amendment right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1109-10; 
United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127,1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to 
presence at sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in 
absentia unless the defendant waives the right to presence. 
A. THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE A KNOWING AND 
VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT 
SENTENCING. 
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve 
an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110 (further 
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and 
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 
678-79 (Utah 1986). 
6 
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defendant must, at the very least, be IMVCII nnlici uCllic pun mluiL1, Andc^on. ll)J,i| I' ,M 
at 1110. : • . edition, the directive given the defendant must pi ovide sufficient warning 
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defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocul u m when • 11 ie 
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be 
present. Id. at 1110-11 The Court recognized'that the right to allocution at sentencing 
"ir i ^ .^i.. . present" found -. .. ; onst art I ,.J t^ 
1111 .- « / * 
^j^rmed of the trial dale, his execution of a written waiver of his right to be prc&ci his 
failure to appear at trial, and his failure to keep in touch with counsel or appear at 
sentencing. Id. at I I 10 Il II! 
l l r I '"ti l l! M i i ' t i t M i i i i" • i ui •! Ji'U'ji.ii ui Aiiiiei'soii ii-i u insistent with the McPherson 
approach of requiring that "the defendant be informed that the proceeding 1ield 
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on whether the defendant was informed the hearing wouki p- >ceed in his ahsen« iu 
determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to presence Vk i 'hereon, 
421 F.2d at 1129-30. In fact, although the trial judge in McPherson made it cleat ih ii 
il'/k ndant was to be present at sentencing and that serious consequences would ,^c\v .* 
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policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to 
appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had 
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia, 
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to 
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson. the Anderson court stated, ff[t]o 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the 
proceedings." Id. (citing McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in 
McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear, 
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that 
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia. 
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him 
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent 
with United States Supreme Court case law interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby 
v. United States, 506 U.S. 255,256,113 S.Ct. 748,749,122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In 
Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a defendant who fails to 
appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, ,f'[s]ince the notion that trial 
may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it would hardly seem 
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence 
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial 
would proceed without him. Id. 
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I ay lot v I Jnited States, 4 I -l 11 S I «l I ""*'""' *) f In making a distinction between absenting 
oneself mid-trial and not appearing ;i( (lie hr^imnnu I In ill I * n pmpi .i"«. ml ilrd m m nig 
whether a defendant waived his right to presence, the t uie Court recognized that a 
defendant who flees mid-trial knows that the trial has begun and will proceed w ithout him 
\ \ liei L.;S a deien.iw •.,.. %iocs not appear at the beginning of trial has no such knowledge. 
ilk'tti * . :.. acK*!.*:ai.« tus$ 
mid-trial, a knowing waiver is nut demonstrated • ^-. •' • * • :U * - ; 1 
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Although Anderson supports the McPherson approach, it also fails to control the 
issue In1 lore thr i "oil IIIII I eiausc n involved circumstances which are different from those 
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waiver of the right to presence. In determining whether 'the subsequent sentencing could 
also be conducted in absentia, the Court looked to cases involving similar circumstances 
where a defendant w as properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of 
sentencin '...-«-> — ; '* >'1 ,l " " m 'h'< aiisi il ^nu 'd > u'alt: JI anomaly to be able 
tu ii)
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unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia 
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The 
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant 
appeared at the plea hearing but was not informed that sentencing would occur without 
him, then later failed to appear at sentencing. 
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical 
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See 
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209 
(Ariz. 1983). fl[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present 
at his sentencing." Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952, 
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("'The requirement that the defendant be present 
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical 
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of 
the information needed for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge 
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is 
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis. 664 
P.2dat209. 
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other 
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating 
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker 
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of 
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter 
10 
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important 
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done • 
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge 
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive 
*onally the official expression of society's condemnation for his 
comitK i The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to he 
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied Hy 
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime. 
1 iirner, M,1" I Nupp .ill 'M S. 
P t e s r t i t T iifll i t ' defhitLtiill nil Hnitnit'fiiy .(Ikm p i v s c m (lie <li<>mh mil llii 
indi > ideals being sentenced as well as the court and "the system itself. 
~ .' for (he dignity of the individual is ai ihe bust *Ti1u j'jhi -~ n 
u when society authoritative!} proceeds to decide and announce 
ii will deprive him of libera /. . hows a fwuiameniiu lack <>/* 
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence 
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the 
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man 
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both 
sentence and conviction. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important 
policy consideratioiis relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence 
ill sculuiui)).', ii'Lin'I he UIMI \ vi.n ili cl See id. al 'Mi > (importantpolicy considerations 
supporting right to presence at sentencing "militate .mains! „i i uli „illi m inp presnin: at 
sentencing to be lightly waived") 
Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, mam jurisdictions 
tvtiiM lo allity11 Miileiiciiig in absentia except in cxti'tinhlmaiy circumstances. Fcttis., 664 
P.2d al ?,0C> Snrli r^tnionliiun i III iiiiiiir l.iiini r \v\\\\\ "m iiir imlml" lid.) iiui'i nn Indi 
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circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at 
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary 
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the 
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does 
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowerv v. State, 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the 
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced 
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App. 
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in 
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia); 
People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that 
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fiilly advised that sentencing 
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris. 564 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that, at the very least, a defendant must be 
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly 
waive his right to presence. 
While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and Article I, section 12, Utah 
Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing the defendant to speak and present 
information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even though 
12 
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defendant ? « 
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ttes a 'knowing 
waiver of the right to presence at sentencing More iinpnrl;nill\, ovrn if Knit IVi.iM I 
applied to sentencing hearings rather than trial, the Article I, section 12 right to presence 
at sentencing u uiv i uic Because of the greater importance ofpresen.ee at 
sentencing, idamenta > K roots in requiring presence at sentencing and, 
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present, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be waived except in extraordinary 
circumstances which may include circumstances where the defendant was informed that 
the sentencing would be held even if he did not appear. 
In the present case where Hamling was not informed that he would be sentenced 
even if he did not appear at sentencing, Hamling did not knowingly waive his right to 
presence at sentencing. 
Additionally, the record fails to demonstrate a voluntary waiver of the right to 
presence. The record shows that Hamling has emotional, mental health and cognitive 
challenges (PSR). His sister indicated that he has difficulty with dates and time. Given 
the presumption against waiver, the information that Hamling may be unable to tell time 
and has cognitive difficulties which interfere with his ability to keep appointments, and 
the lack of any other information as to the reasons for Hamling not appearing at 
sentencing, the record fails to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
presence. 
Because the record does not demonstrate that Hamling knowingly and voluntarily 
waived the right to presence, the trial judge erred in sentencing him in absentia and the 
sentence must be vacated. 
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DID NOT REQUIRE THAT HAMLING BE 
SENTENCED IN ABSENTIA. 
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for 
14 
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sentencing in 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing in absentia after concluding 
that " [prac t ica l considerations , . . mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing." 
i^  I Mi, "'J1* I" ."ml in i iw., ». .. IUK, cxccuiea a *wU^ii \ \ai \cr o! la> t u J i t t o b e 
pro sen 1 1111 11 I • 11 1111 .1 -i i >uid absent hmi: ^ i, 
for years "and the eventual sentencing would have to be peuormed b\ ;)-•;• J 
unfamiliar wi th the case and had no access to relevant information/1 Id-
C :: ncerns about dilatory defendants who attempt to delay the administration of 
(iiistit " Ibv l.iiliiijji, In .ippcai .il M'nli'iiring are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise 
their discretion to proceed in absentia h*, hi hn< in|» <br |»ui»lir fiiinr^t •«» p iom 'd ing 
[without the tit fondant]11 against the defendant's interest in being prc&cni. Smith v. Mann, 
i ,>d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999). cert denied, 120 S.Ct. 200: ,ee also Fontanez, JT8 F 2d at 
lll'i 
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 
at 36. 
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in 
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a 
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable 
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the 
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to 
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez. 878 F.2d at 36; 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. 
In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Hamling in absentia where the 
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Hamling's interest in being 
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Hamling 
be sentenced in absentia. Hamling could have been easily contacted since he had been at 
the same address for five years (R. 12). In addition, his sister, Jana, could have been 
contacted and asked to make sure he appeared had sentencing been rescheduled (see 
PSR). Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would not have been difficult; 
sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are often rescheduled. The 
state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it presented no information 
pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the same thing if the sentencing 
had been rescheduled. There was no threat that information relevant to sentencing would 
16 
hi11 lost if sentenci"* j - , ••..*. : *. *.i .. . *een prepared and 
filed with the court. Since Judge Frederick i11NI („11, i i. (In e;,i.v ti on• ..iioil.Ci |uduc„ »\;is 
not present when, the plea was taken and had no specific knowledge that wv -
the public had. no interest in maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing 
,: ..,. . oi the cast, inknuaUoh pertinent to sentencing would not be lost 
di< »K -MT: * - * . i nil i<< undermined '".mice Judge l-redenck 
did not sit through the trial as the Anders<>n iiuloe hml ,iinl mil IIMH I.ill i ilir inii 
Moreover, the public interest would have been better served by continuing the 
sentencing hearing so that 1 lamling could be present Requiring Hamling to "account 
pnMh.h" l"«ii lln" ci'iiiic M\ I (.iila; responsibility before the judge lor lus actions better serve 
society's interest in seeking no fiMim1 -/nmiiM1 bed n >• 1v»i» Hamling. See I iimei. SM 
F. Supp. at 915. In addition, M[t]he ceremonial rendering -*f iudgmenl nmv :I'M» \ *>iMi IIHM<* 
to the individual deterrent force of the sentence11 (id.), thereby furthering society's interest 
in having the sentence deter future criminal conduct In this case, Hamling's presence at 
senteri i ini> vi mid hiivr .IN Hiiilh liiillinnl so* ni\ ", interests \Miile also protecting his right 
to presence. 
Handing's fundamental, critical, interest in being present for sentencing was not 
on* , in1 i lis I lie public interest in proceeding, The trialjudge therefore erred in 
"•vnlennnp liiiiiilni). in .ibsnMu iiiid (lie sentence must be vacated. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Jon Donald Hamling respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3dtL day of January, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
NISAJ.SISNEROS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies 
of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 3o4L day of January, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of January, 2001. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Th
'« Judicial DZ?*T 
AUG-
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
GREGORY L. BOWN, 0402 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JON DONALD HAMLING, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 001909844 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on August 4, 2000. The 
State of Utah was represented by its counsel, Gregory L. Bown, Deputy District Attorney, and 
the defendant, who w;i > nol present was represented by Nina Sisneros. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On June 15, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above-entitled matter to 
Attempted Possession < A a < "ontrolled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge Anthony 
B. Quinn. Defendant, who was present with counsel, was referred to AP&P for a presentence 
report and was given the sentencing date of August 4, 2000, at 8:30 AM before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick. < m AU^IISI 4, 2000, lire defendant failed to appear before this court for 
sentencing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Rule 22 states, ' < >n the same grounds ilinl .i defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(b). 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 001909844 
Page 2 
Because defendant and his counsel were both given personal and actual notice of the 
August 4, 2000, sentencing date, and the defendant voluntarily failed to appear for his 
sentencing, defendant should be sentenced in his absence. Furthermore, the defendant has 
waived any right to be present by his voluntary absence after being given personal notice in open 
court. 
ORDER 
Based upon defendant's voluntary absence, defendant shall be sentenced in abstentia for 
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this Ohm of August, 2000. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 001909844 
Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Nina Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jon 
Donald Hamling, at 424 Vast 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day 
of August, 2000. 
ADDENDUM D 
NISAJ.SISNEROS(6654) 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
FILED 
iHIRD DISTRICT COURT 
00AUG 10 PH f: 56 
JALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
n r o n r v pi
 r n ^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
JON DONALD HAMLING, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
CaseNo.001909844FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Defendant, Jon Donald Hamling, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby moves the 
court to correct it's illegal sentence imposed on August 4,2000 pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v. Waestaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and 
State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996). Mr. Hamling was not present at the sentencing. 
The court found that he had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings and sentenced 
him to the maximum jail sentence allowed by law I lowever, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states a defendant is entitled to "make a statement and to present any 
mitigation of punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed". Any 
imposition of sentence without Mr. Hamling's presence violated his rights to due process and to 
allocution as found in the Constitution of Utah art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5th, 8th and 14th 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. At the time of sentencing the court was unaware 
as to why Mr. Hamling was not present. He had appeared at the offices of Adult Probation and 
Parole for a Presentence Report to be completed and at the time of sentencing his Pretrial Release 
had not been revoked. 
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for 
sentencing. Therefore, Mr. Hamling requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a 
bench warrant for his arrest allowing him to address the court prior to being sentenced. 
Mr. Hamling requests the court set this matter for hearing. 
DATED this 10th day of August, 2000 
/ 
J. SIS) 
Attorney foM)efendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of August, 2000. 
ADDENDUM E 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the oflBcer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)fb), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law J 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons-] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint* 
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON DONALD HAMLING, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001909844 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: August 4, 2000 
PRESENT ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
Clerk: cindyb OF JUDGMENTS 
P r o s e c u t o r : BOWN, GREGORY L. <? „ M —fit**) 
Defendant not present DATE ,. U I WS / 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : SISNEROS, NISA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of b i r t h : J a n u a r y 6, 1962 IKIA/Nn^ 
video ^ IMAGED 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:43-9:47 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) 
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/15/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Credit is granted for 28 day(s) previously served. 
Criminal Sentence U.H~ 
HAMLING, JON DOrJD 
Case No: 001909844 
Date: Aug 04, 2000 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from 
the sentencing proceedings. The Court orders defendant be committed 
forthwith upon his arrest on this Court's warrant. Counsel for the 
State to prepare the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and order Be absentia. 
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Case No. 001909844FS 
gENTENCINg 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON DONALD HAMLING, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of August 
2000, commencing at the hour of 9:43 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
Sc? 1 9 20Q0 
GREGORY L. BOWN 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 F a s t Rnn South S u i t e 300 
Salt LakEl lv .Et lh l 84111 : 500 mith.  flfcEB 
OCT 1 7 2000 
ORIGINAL 
star ALAN P. SMITH, CSR _ _ ^ ^ ^ . , , 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (80.) 2 6 ^ @ y R J Q F A P P E A L 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 l W W W ' 
£COTt£>l2>-tA 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Ms. Sisneros? 
MS. SISNEROS: A few other matters and I don't— 
he's another one of my clients, Jon Hamling, No. 20. 
THE COURT: Let's go to that matter, Ms. 
Sisneros. State of Utah versus Jon Donald Hamling, Case 
No. CR009844, you're appearing in his behalf, Ms. Sisneros. 
Mr. Bown, you're here for the State? 
MR. BOWN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Jon Donald Hamling is not 
here. 
MR. BOWN: (Inaudible) last him in jail. Did he 
get out? 
THE COURT: Well, it shows here Pre-Trial 
Services. 
MR. BOWN: Okay. 
THE COURT: For the record, I will, 
notwithstanding, I'm sure, your objection, Ms. Sisneros, 
and for the record, I'll note your objection, proceed with 
sentencing at this time. 
The defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 
15th of June of this year to the Class A misdemeanor crime 
of attempted possession of a controlled substance. A pre-
sentence report was ordered, has now been received and 
2 
reviewed. I assume you've seen the report. 
And other than his non-presence, do you have any 
legal reason why we shouldn't proceed with sentencing at 
this time? 
MS. SISNEROS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Before I determine what's to be done 
here# do you wish to say anything on behalf of Mr. Hamling? 
I'm sure at some point, he would appreciate any words you 
have in that regard. 
MS. SISNEROS: Yeah. I—actually, I—I did see 
Mr. Hamling a couple weeks ago and at that point, he hadn't 
done his—his pre-sentence report. I told him he needed to 
come down and do it and he did do that, so to his credit, 
he did listen to—to me and have a pre-sentence report done 
and did show up on another case in—in court a couple weeks 
ago. 
Aside from that, I—not having talked to him 
specifically about this case, I don't know what else to—to 
say to the Court. I would just ask that if he did do any 
time, that he be credited for that time. I don't know how 
much he did. 
THE COURT: All right, Ms. Sisneros. 
It is the determination of this Court, based upon 
the defendant's failure to appear, that he has voluntarily 
absented him from these proceedings. This Court has had no 
3 
1 J contact with him, through my clerk or otherwise. I take 
2 J it, Ms* Sisneros, you've not heard from the man for at 
3 I least two weeks. 
4 MS. SISNEROS: That's correct. 
5 THE COURT: He was advised specifically of this 
6 date for appearance, both orally and in writing and 
7 therefore, it is my determination that he voluntarily 
8 absented himself. 
9 1 Mr. Bown, I'll ask you to do the findings of 
10 fact, conclusions of law and order. 
11 It is the judgment of this Court that Mr. Hamling 
12 be committed to the Adult Detention Center for the period 
13 of one year for the Class A misdemeanor crime to which he 
14 has pled guilty. I will order that that service be 
15 commenced forthwith upon his apprehension and that he be 
16 ordered to pay a recoupment fee in the amount of $200 for 
17 J your fine appearance in his behalf. 
18 I I don't see at this point that he's had any time 
19 I served awaiting disposition originally; 28 days he did 
20 J serve awaiting disposition, it appears in this matter, so 
21 I'll grant him credit for 28 days that he's already served. 
22 J Thank you, Ms. Sisneros. 
23 MS. SISNEROS: Thank you. 
24 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
25 * * * 
TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within 
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same 
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 
to 4, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a 
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is 
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were 
inaudible* 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of 
September, 2000. 
ft A- ^XL 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s 12th day 
of September, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY. UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4.2001 
STATE OF UTAH Notary Publ 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIPTCATF 
: ss. 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
I# Alan P, Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 4, inclusive, to the best of my 
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 13th day of 
September, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
COMMISSIONEXPIRES 
DEC. 4.2001 -
ftTATEOFUTAH I 
i 
Notary P i i b l i c 
( S E A L ) 
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Case No. 001909844FS 
PLEA HEARINg 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON DONALD HAHLING, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of June, 
2000, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the HONORABLE ANTHONY B. QUINN, sitting as Judge 
in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, 
and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: B. KENT MORGAN 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: 
St? 1 9 2000 
SALT LAKc WWW. «* T 
FILED 
OCT 1 7 2000 
ORIGINAL 
star ALAN P. SMITH. CSR p A | I R T O F A P P 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801)266-0320 V / U U n l \Jl A l I 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
'cxO&aa-ovi 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MS. SISNEROS: Jon Hamling. 
Your Honor, Mr. Hamling will be pleading to an 
attempted possession of methamphetaminef Class A, and Count 
2 will be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hamling, have you been provided a 
plea form to read? 
MR. HAMLING: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: Have your read that form carefully? 
MR. HAMLING: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: Any questions about it? 
MR. HAMLING: No questions. 
THE COURT: Go ahead and sign it, please. 
To the charge of attempted possession of 
controlled substance, how do you plead? 
MR. HAMLING: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I'll accept your plea to that charge. 
It#s a Class A misdemeanor. The second charge in this case 
will be dismissed. You have only 30 days to make a written 
motion to withdraw your plea for good cause. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. HAMLING: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is this a case where we'll need a 
pre-sentence report? Mr. Morgan? 
2 
1 MR. MORGAN: I believe we would, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Let's get a pre-sentence 
3 report from A P & P and we'll set this matter over for 
4 sentencing. 
5 THE CLERK: That will be before Judge Frederick 
6 on August 4th at 8:30 in the morning. 
7 MS. SISNEROS: And your Honor, it's my 
8 understanding that Pre-Trial is willing to take Mr. 
9 Hamling. 
10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's correct, sir. 
11 I THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Morgan? 
12 MR. MORGAN: No, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Released to Pre-Trial 
14 Services with all normal conditions that they would impose. 
15 MS. SISNEROS: Thank you, your Honor. That's all 
16 I have, may I please be excused? 
17 THE COURT: You may. 
18 J (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
19 
20 | * * * 
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